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Evaluating Frontier Models for Dangerous Capabilities

Paper · 2024 · Mary Phuong, Matthew Aitchison, Elliot Catt et al.

Summary

Popular benchmarks measure broad skills such as coding or maths, and most safety tests check whether a model refuses harmful requests. Neither shows what a frontier system could actually do if misused. This Google DeepMind paper proposes a methodology for measuring "dangerous capabilities" and pilots it on Gemini 1.0 Ultra, Pro and Nano 3.25B, with runs in January 2024. The suite spans four areas:

  • persuasion and deception, through dialogue studies with human participants;
  • cyber-security, through capture-the-flag challenges and vulnerability detection;
  • self-proliferation, through autonomous agent tasks such as deploying a model on a cloud server;
  • self-reasoning, through recognising when self-modification is needed.

To avoid underestimating the models, the authors tested them without safety filters and wrapped them in agent scaffolding with planning frameworks and tools. No model showed strong dangerous capabilities. Persuasion and deception looked most developed, and the stronger models had rudimentary skills in every area. The work matters as an early template for evaluations that inform AI policy and risk-tiered security rules. Evaluation code is not released, but prompts and rater instructions are documented.

Key points

  • Evaluations include Money Talks, Charm Offensive, Hidden Agenda (3 tasks) and Web of Lies for persuasion. Cyber-security uses 13 in-house CTFs, 13 Hack The Box challenges and 3 vulnerability-detection tasks. Self-proliferation has 11 tasks, and self-reasoning covers knowledge gaps (2) and instrumental self-modification (4).
  • Gemini Pro 1.0 often matched Ultra 1.0 and sometimes beat it on persuasion. The authors conclude that models just behind the frontier also need scrutiny.
  • Professional forecasters gave median dates of 2025–2029 for when models will first score highly on these evaluations.
  • Forecasters put the probability that AI becomes a top-3 issue in Gallup's "Most Important Problem" poll before 2030 at 32% unconditionally. That rose to 47% if a single system passes a defined subset of the evaluations before 2027, and 68% if an open-weight system does.
  • CBRN evaluations are only sketched as a preliminary framework (Appendix B). The paper includes canary strings so that it can be kept out of training corpora.

Our summary of the paper, in our own words — not its text. The work belongs to its authors; read it at the links above.

 Fields, topics and concepts

Cite

Cite as Mary Phuong, Matthew Aitchison, Elliot Catt, Sarah Cogan, Alexandre Kaskasoli, Victoria Krakovna, David Lindner, Matthew Rahtz, Yannis Assael, Sarah Hodkinson, Heidi Howard, Tom Lieberum, Ramana Kumar, Maria Abi Raad, Albert Webson, Lewis Ho, Sharon Lin, Sebastian Farquhar, Marcus Hutter, Gregoire Deletang, Anian Ruoss, Seliem El-Sayed, Sasha Brown, Anca Dragan, Rohin Shah, Allan Dafoe and Toby Shevlane. 2024. Evaluating Frontier Models for Dangerous Capabilities. arXiv:2403.13793.

The paper itself, not this page. BibTeX from the library's record of the work. DOI 10.48550/arxiv.2403.13793 · arXiv 2403.13793

@misc{phuong2024evaluating,
  title = {{Evaluating Frontier Models for Dangerous Capabilities}},
  author = {Mary Phuong, Matthew Aitchison, Elliot Catt, Sarah Cogan, Alexandre Kaskasoli, Victoria Krakovna, David Lindner, Matthew Rahtz, Yannis Assael, Sarah Hodkinson, Heidi Howard, Tom Lieberum, Ramana Kumar, Maria Abi Raad, Albert Webson, Lewis Ho, Sharon Lin, Sebastian Farquhar, Marcus Hutter, Gregoire Deletang, Anian Ruoss, Seliem El-Sayed, Sasha Brown, Anca Dragan, Rohin Shah, Allan Dafoe and Toby Shevlane},
  year = {2024},
  doi = {10.48550/arxiv.2403.13793},
  eprint = {2403.13793},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2403.13793}
}

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