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Model evaluation for extreme risks

Paper · 2023 · Toby Shevlane, Sebastian Farquhar, Ben Garfinkel et al.

Summary

This position paper, from authors at Google DeepMind, OpenAI, Anthropic, GovAI and academic institutions, argues that general-purpose AI models may develop harmful abilities their creators never targeted. Examples include cyber-offense and manipulation, which could lead to harm on a catastrophic scale. Rather than introducing a dataset or benchmark, the authors propose a conceptual framework that expands evaluation practice in two directions. First, dangerous capability evaluations test what a model is able to do. Second, alignment evaluations test whether the model tends to use those abilities harmfully.

The paper explains how evaluation results should inform four governance areas: decisions about training, decisions about deployment, transparency toward stakeholders, and information security. It lists candidate dangerous capabilities and sets out design criteria for evaluations. It also acknowledges limitations, such as models being trained to pass the tests superficially and harms caused by the testing itself. The main contribution is a theory of change that places such evaluations inside company policy and regulation. This matters because it shaped how frontier labs and governments later approached pre-deployment safety testing.

Key points

  • Scope of "extreme" risk: The authors define it as harm on the order of tens of thousands of deaths or hundreds of billions of dollars in damage, or as severe disruption of social and political order. They cite a 2022 survey in which 36% of AI researchers considered a catastrophe comparable to nuclear war plausible this century.
  • Dangerous capabilities (Table 1): The non-exhaustive list includes cyber-offense, deception, persuasion and manipulation, political strategy, weapons acquisition, long-horizon planning, AI development and situational awareness.
  • Alignment evaluation targets: These include pursuing unintended long-term goals, power-seeking, resisting shutdown, colluding with other AI systems, and how well the model resists misuse by malicious users.
  • Unintended harms of evaluation: One risk is overfitting to evaluations, so the authors suggest keeping some held-out tests private. Another is harm during testing itself, illustrated by ARC's GPT-4 test, in which the model produced deceptive messages for a TaskRabbit worker.
  • Recommendations: Developers should invest in evaluation research, set internal policies, support outside researchers and educate policymakers. Policymakers should track capabilities, fund external evaluation, mandate audits and block deployment of models that pose extreme risks.

Our summary of the paper, in our own words — not its text. The work belongs to its authors; read it at the links above.

 Institutions

Also on the byline: The Collective Intelligence Project.

 Fields, topics and concepts

Cite

Cite as Toby Shevlane, Sebastian Farquhar, Ben Garfinkel, Mary Phuong, Jess Whittlestone, Jade Leung, Daniel Kokotajlo, Nahema Marchal, Markus Anderljung, Noam Kolt, Lewis Ho, Divya Siddarth, Shahar Avin, Will Hawkins, Been Kim, Iason Gabriel, Vijay Bolina, Jack Clark, Yoshua Bengio, Paul Christiano and Allan Dafoe. 2023. Model evaluation for extreme risks. arXiv:2305.15324.

The paper itself, not this page. BibTeX from the library's record of the work. DOI 10.48550/arxiv.2305.15324 · arXiv 2305.15324

@misc{shevlane2023model,
  title = {{Model evaluation for extreme risks}},
  author = {Toby Shevlane, Sebastian Farquhar, Ben Garfinkel, Mary Phuong, Jess Whittlestone, Jade Leung, Daniel Kokotajlo, Nahema Marchal, Markus Anderljung, Noam Kolt, Lewis Ho, Divya Siddarth, Shahar Avin, Will Hawkins, Been Kim, Iason Gabriel, Vijay Bolina, Jack Clark, Yoshua Bengio, Paul Christiano and Allan Dafoe},
  year = {2023},
  doi = {10.48550/arxiv.2305.15324},
  eprint = {2305.15324},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2305.15324}
}

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