Communication Enables Cooperation in LLM Agents: A Comparison with Curriculum-Based Approaches
Paper · 2026 · Hachem Madmoun and Salem Lahlou
Summary
The paper examines how to make LLM agents cooperate in social dilemmas. It compares two interventions: an explicit communication channel and in-context curriculum learning. Four instruction-tuned models (Mixtral-8x22B, Qwen2.5-72B, Llama-3.3-70B, DeepSeek-V3) played classic game-theory scenarios through the DeepInfra API.
In a 4-player Stag Hunt, letting agents send one word before acting raised cooperation in mixed-model groups from zero to 48.3%. The curriculum had agents work through progressively harder games before a 10-round Iterated Public Goods Game with Punishment (IPGG+P). Between stages, Claude Opus 4.1 summarized strategic lessons for the agents.
Every curriculum variant scored below a no-training control, and the full sequence scored 27.4% lower. Reasoning traces showed that agents took defection lessons from short games into settings where cooperation pays off. The authors call this "learned pessimism." Replacing the lessons with neutral text removed most of the effect.
The study suggests that cheap talk is a more dependable coordination tool than experience-based prompting. It also shows that the order of games and the content of lessons can backfire.
Key points
- Stag Hunt results: Heterogeneous groups went from 0% to 48.3% cooperation with communication. Same-family coalitions already reached 52.2% without communication and 50.0% with it. Communication also removed payoff variance in coalitions (17.9 ± 11.8 → 30.0 ± 0.0).
- Curriculum conditions: There were 30 trials per condition (29 for the full curriculum). The control averaged 211.7 tokens. Relative to the control, the Direct Precursor scored −6.0%, the Scrambled order −14.0%, and the Full Curriculum (2-Player IPD → N-Player IPD → 3-round IPGG → IPGG+P) −27.4%, at 153.6 tokens.
- Communication in IPGG+P:
- At a 1.6x multiplier, contributions rose from 48% to 71%, but payoffs fell from 184.4 to 127.5 because signalling cooperators were exploited.
- At a 4.0x multiplier, contributions reached 100% and payoffs rose from 457.9 to 480.0.
- Neutral Lesson Ablation: Learned pessimism appeared in 62% of Full Curriculum traces versus under 5% with neutral lessons. Generic or role-play reasoning appeared in 20% versus 83%. Neutral lessons were also linked to a 63% payoff gain.
- Validation and limitations: The authors report that GPT-4o and o1-preview showed the same communication pattern. The authors acknowledge several limitations:
- The curriculum placed defection-equilibrium games first.
- Human-written lessons were not tested.
- Only in-context learning was used, with no fine-tuning.
Institutions
Fields, topics and concepts
📚 Shelves 6The field of science this work belongs to (OpenAlex fields).Computer Science · 16,667 worksArtificial Intelligence · 16,194 worksSocial Sciences · 1,772 worksSociology and Political Science · 577 worksDecision Sciences · 209 worksManagement Science and Operations Research · 108 works
Cite
Cite as Hachem Madmoun and Salem Lahlou. 2026. Communication Enables Cooperation in LLM Agents: A Comparison with Curriculum-Based Approaches. Proceedings of the 19th Conference of the European Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 2: Short Papers).
@inproceedings{madmoun2026communication,
title = {{Communication Enables Cooperation in LLM Agents: A Comparison with Curriculum-Based Approaches}},
author = {Hachem Madmoun and Salem Lahlou},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 19th Conference of the European Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 2: Short Papers)},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.18653/v1/2026.eacl-short.23},
url = {https://doi.org/10.18653/v1/2026.eacl-short.23}
}References
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