from Benign import Toxic: Jailbreaking the Language Model via Adversarial Metaphors
Summary
The paper argues that black-box jailbreaks which try to extract harmful content from an LLM in a single step are becoming easier to detect, because the malicious intent stays visible in the prompt. The authors suggest a different route: get the model to explain a harmless analogue of the forbidden task, then ask it to translate that explanation back into the real domain. Their framework, AVATAR, has two parts. Adversarial Entity Mapping (AEM) breaks a harmful query into key entities and asks a pool of crowdsourced LLMs, sampled at high temperature, to propose benign metaphorical counterparts. Candidates are filtered with Internal Consistency Similarity (ICS), computed over BGE-M3 embeddings, and Conceptual Disparity (CD), which together balance usefulness against how well the intent is hidden. Metaphor-Induced Reasoning (MIR) then embeds the chosen metaphor in a multi-turn dialogue and has the target model calibrate the gap between the metaphorical and the actual answer. AVATAR needs no training and reports state-of-the-art attack success rates that transfer across several LLMs. The work exposes a reasoning-based weakness in current safety alignment.
Key points
- AVATAR exceeds 92% ASR on GPT-4o within 3 retries and also elicits harmful output from reasoning models such as ChatGPT-o1. It was evaluated on AdvBench and Harmbench.
- The attack is formalized as building a directed semantic graph, where the goal is to recover the relations among harmful entities by way of benign entities and the mappings between the two sets.
- The defenses tested, adaptive system prompts and target-side summarization, cut ASR by about 16–33 points on AdvBench but do not eliminate the attack.
- Weaker crowdsourced models such as Interlm2.5-7B supplied more effective metaphors than GPT-4o-mini or Llama-3.1-70B, likely because they have looser safety alignment. Cognitive, Logical and Concrete analogies were the dominant successful types.
- The authors disclosed the findings to the maintainers of the GLM, Qwen, Llama and GPT models and restricted the code release.
Cite
@inproceedings{yan2025benign,
title = {{from Benign import Toxic: Jailbreaking the Language Model via Adversarial Metaphors}},
author = {Yan, Yu and Sun, Sheng and Duan, Zenghao and Liu, Teli and Liu, Min and Yin, Zhiyi and Lei, Jingyu and Li, Qi},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 63rd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)},
year = {2025},
doi = {10.18653/v1/2025.acl-long.238},
url = {https://doi.org/10.18653/v1/2025.acl-long.238}
}References
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