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Conflict, cheap talk, and Jespersen’s cycle

Paper · 2017 · Christopher Ahern and Robin Clark

Summary

The paper asks why emphatic negation loses its force in Jespersen's cycle: a bipartite form such as Middle English ne…not starts out emphatic, spreads, and ends up as ordinary negation. The authors separate the formal cycle (how much material expresses negation) from the functional cycle (how many functionally distinct negative forms exist). They treat the functional cycle as inflation. They model it as a cheap-talk signaling game. Speakers observe a standard of evidence and choose a negative form. Hearers respond with attention, which gives the speaker social status. Interests are mostly shared, but speakers are biased toward getting more status for less information. The authors derive the evolutionarily stable strategies and run the game under replicator dynamics. They then fit the model to time-series data from a Middle English corpus. Emphatic forms get overused, become less informative, and hearers discount them. A model with a speaker bias fits the data far better than one without. This matters because it gives an explicit, causal mechanism for a frequency change that earlier work assumed but never formulated, and its parameters can be estimated and interpreted.

Key points

  • Canonical stages: neg V → neg V (neg) → neg V neg → V neg. The English path runs from Old English ne to Middle English ne…not to Early Modern not. French follows a similar path (ne → ne…pas → pas).
  • The authors argue that the formal cycle depends on how much material expresses negation, not on its position. AAVE eem shows that the added element can be pre-verbal.
  • The framework is evolutionary game theory: costless signals, ESS analysis, and deterministic replicator dynamics fitted to historical corpus frequencies.
  • In model comparison, the full model with speaker bias beats the simplified nested model. The likelihood-ratio statistic is D = 1142.853 (χ² with 1 df, p < .001). The Akaike weight of the simpler model is about as likely as 800 heads in a row.
  • A LOESS curve could reach a lower AIC, but the authors reject it as an explanation because its parameters have no mechanistic meaning.

Interesting ideas

  • I1. Emphasis can be modeled as an inflating signal: a marked form carries strong information only while it is rare, and its value drops as frequency rises.
  • I2. Speaker and hearer interests can be represented as aligned but slightly conflicting, with a bias parameter for the speaker's pull toward status.
  • I3. The authors judge models jointly on fit, complexity (AIC), and interpretability, and they refuse to adopt a better-fitting curve whose parameters explain nothing.
  • I4. They test the full model against a nested simplified model with one parameter removed, using a likelihood-ratio test and Akaike weights.
  • I5. Splitting one label ("Jespersen's cycle") into a form-level process and a function-level process prevents conflating structure with meaning.

For Mova

How these ideas could serve Mova, our small open language model — its files, stages and tests:

  • I1 (frames): intensity or emphasis detection in prag could weight markers like "really" or "at all" by corpus frequency, so that worn-out intensifiers are not read as strong speech-act signals.
  • I2 (frames): implicature and irony reasoning could include an explicit speaker-bias term, so that overstatement is discounted in an explainable, parameterized way.
  • I3 (learn): when choosing between repair rules or learned components, record AIC-style complexity penalties and prefer components whose parameters map onto linguistic causes.
  • I4 (learn): ablation-style negative controls could be reported as nested-model comparisons with explicit significance, rather than raw accuracy differences only.
  • I5 (tree): annotation of negation in UD trees could record the form, such as bipartite versus single marker, separately from its pragmatic force, which would be passed to frames.

Our summary of the paper, in our own words — not its text. The work belongs to its authors; read it at the links above.

 Institutions

 Fields, topics and concepts

Cite

Cite as Christopher Ahern and Robin Clark. 2017. Conflict, cheap talk, and Jespersen’s cycle. Semantics and Pragmatics.

The paper itself, not this page. BibTeX from the library's record of the work. DOI 10.3765/sp.10.11

@article{ahern2017conflict,
  title = {{Conflict, cheap talk, and Jespersen’s cycle}},
  author = {Christopher Ahern and Robin Clark},
  journal = {Semantics and Pragmatics},
  year = {2017},
  doi = {10.3765/sp.10.11},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.3765/sp.10.11}
}

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