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SilentDrift: Exploiting Action Chunking for Stealthy Backdoor Attacks on Vision-Language-Action Models

Paper · 2026 · Bingxin Xu, Yuzhang Shang, Binghui Wang et al.

Summary

The paper exposes a security weakness in modern Vision-Language-Action (VLA) robot policies. When a model predicts a chunk of K future actions as relative (delta pose) movements, the robot carries out the whole chunk without visual correction. This intra-chunk open loop lets small per-step errors add up into a large positional drift. The authors build SilentDrift, a black-box data-poisoning backdoor that exploits this. In poisoned demonstrations, the trigger appears only during the final approach to the target (a keyframe strategy). The injected offset is shaped with the Smootherstep quintic polynomial, so it starts and ends with zero velocity and acceleration (C2 continuity). Earlier VLA backdoors such as BadVLA, GoBA and TabVLA cause abrupt, visible failures. SilentDrift instead produces a natural-looking near-miss that passes dynamics-based trajectory filters and human review. On LIBERO, with π0 and VLA-Adapter, the attack succeeds most of the time with very little poisoned data and leaves clean behaviour intact. The authors argue that architectures using large chunks are inherently more exposed and need new defenses.

Key points

  • Main result on LIBERO: 93.2% Attack Success Rate (ASR) with under 2% poisoned data (about one poisoned episode per task), while Clean Task Success Rate stays at 95.3%.
  • Drift scales roughly linearly with chunk size (‖E_accum‖ ≈ K·‖δ̄‖). For example, a 1 mm per-step offset becomes about 5 cm over a K = 50 chunk.
  • Ablations on chunk size:
    • Switching from K = 1 to K = 4 sharply increases ASR.
    • Larger chunks increase it further, but gains level off because LIBERO tasks have short horizons.
  • Ablations on attack timing and shape:
    • Triggering only near the target matches full-trajectory triggering, unless activation is very late (0.05 m), which leaves too little time for drift to build up.
    • Smootherstep is as effective as constant-offset and Smoothstep perturbations, so stealth does not reduce attack strength.
  • Trigger robustness: colour and size (3–10 px) barely affect ASR. Opacity matters more: ASR is 86.7% at α = 0.3 and 95.6% at α = 1.0.

Our summary of the paper, in our own words — not its text. The work belongs to its authors; read it at the links above.

 Institutions

 Fields, topics and concepts

📚 Shelves 3The field of science this work belongs to (OpenAlex fields).Computer Science · 18,614 worksArtificial Intelligence · 17,965 worksSoftware · 119 works

🧭 Topics 1Research subjects and languages the work is about.Vision & language · 811 works

Cite

Cite as Bingxin Xu, Yuzhang Shang, Binghui Wang and Emilio Ferrara. 2026. SilentDrift: Exploiting Action Chunking for Stealthy Backdoor Attacks on Vision-Language-Action Models. Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: ACL 2026.

The paper itself, not this page. BibTeX from the library's record of the work. DOI 10.18653/v1/2026.findings-acl.1725

@inproceedings{xu2026silentdrift,
  title = {{SilentDrift: Exploiting Action Chunking for Stealthy Backdoor Attacks on Vision-Language-Action Models}},
  author = {Bingxin Xu, Yuzhang Shang, Binghui Wang and Emilio Ferrara},
  booktitle = {Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: ACL 2026},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.18653/v1/2026.findings-acl.1725},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.18653/v1/2026.findings-acl.1725}
}

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