Towards Understanding the Robustness of Sparse Autoencoders
Paper · 2026 · Ahson Saiyed, Sabrina Sadiekh and Chirag Agarwal
Summary
Jailbreak attacks that optimize adversarial suffixes against an LLM's internals remain a serious threat. It is also unclear how Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs), normally used for interpretability, affect this vulnerability. The authors splice pretrained SAEs into the residual stream of one intermediate layer at inference time, so the activation there is replaced by its sparse reconstruction. Model weights stay frozen and gradients still flow, so attackers can optimize through the SAE. They test Gemma-2, LLaMA-3, Mistral and Qwen2.5 (2B to 70B parameters) against white-box GCG and BEAST attacks on HarmBench, plus three black-box prompt collections. SAE-augmented models show jailbreak success rates up to five times lower than unprotected ones, and adversarial suffixes transfer less well between models. Ablations show that attack success falls steadily as L0 sparsity tightens. Layer choice trades robustness against clean performance, with middle layers giving the best compromise. Gradient and feature analyses point to a representational bottleneck rather than gradient masking. The work suggests that interpretability tooling can double as a cheap defense that needs no retraining.
Key points
- Models: Gemma-2 (2B, 9B, 27B), LLaMA-3 (8B, 70B), Mistral-7B and Qwen2.5-7B. Layer-placement studies use multi-layer SAE suites on Gemma-2-9B and Qwen2.5. The SAEs use ReLU encoders with roughly 16× latent expansion.
- Attack setup:
- GCG runs 500 steps with 20-token suffixes.
- BEAST uses k1=k2=15 and depth L=20.
- The black-box test uses 1,500 prompts from Salad-Data, Prompt Injections Benchmark and SafeEval.
- Results are aggregated over 24 HarmBench batches.
- Insertion depth: Early insertion gives the strongest defense but hurts clean behavior. Late insertion barely helps. The pattern holds across Gemma, LLaMA and Qwen.
- Longer optimization: Raising GCG from 500 to 1500 steps does not break the defense against base-optimized suffixes. Base→SAE ASR goes from 10.0% to 4.0% on Gemma and stays at 34.0% on LLaMA-3.1-8B-Instruct. SAE-optimized suffixes, however, transfer back better (LLaMA SAE→Base: 24.0%→64.0%).
- Mechanism and limits:
- Adversarial suffixes share a sparse feature subspace that SAE routing disrupts.
- Gradients show lower effective rank and larger spectral gaps.
- Black-box gains are evident mainly under HarmBench's classifier.
Institutions
Fields, topics and concepts
📚 Shelves 2The field of science this work belongs to (OpenAlex fields).Computer Science · 16,667 worksArtificial Intelligence · 16,194 works
Cite
Cite as Ahson Saiyed, Sabrina Sadiekh and Chirag Agarwal. 2026. Towards Understanding the Robustness of Sparse Autoencoders. Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: ACL 2026.
@inproceedings{saiyed2026understanding,
title = {{Towards Understanding the Robustness of Sparse Autoencoders}},
author = {Ahson Saiyed, Sabrina Sadiekh and Chirag Agarwal},
booktitle = {Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: ACL 2026},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.18653/v1/2026.findings-acl.1298},
url = {https://doi.org/10.18653/v1/2026.findings-acl.1298}
}References
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