Does ChatGPT Resemble Humans in Processing Implicatures?
Paper · 2023 · Zhuang Qiu, Xufeng Duan and Zhenguang Cai
Summary
The paper asks whether ChatGPT handles conversational implicatures the way people do. Implicatures are meanings a listener infers beyond the literal content, for example reading "most" as "not all". The authors ran three preregistered experiments on the Feb 13 version of ChatGPT and reused paradigms from human studies so the results could be compared directly.
- Experiment 1 follows Doran et al. (2012). The model judged short dialogues against a stated fact under two instructions: a plain judgement, or a judgement of literal truth only. This tested whether it can switch off generalized conversational implicatures (GCIs) on request.
- Experiments 2 and 3 asked whether communicative context changes how often scalar implicatures (SIs) are drawn.
Humans compute fewer GCIs when told to read literally, and they draw fewer SIs when the enriched reading would threaten the listener's face. ChatGPT did neither. It kept computing implicatures under literal instructions. Its scalar judgements were essentially deterministic: "some" was always read as "not all", and "or" was almost always read inclusively.
This matters because ChatGPT matches humans on many other psycholinguistic effects, yet here it shows a clear gap in context-sensitive pragmatic flexibility.
Key points
- Experiment 1 used 44 critical items: three GCI families (Q-based, I-based, M-based) split into subcategories with four items each. It also included 16 fillers from Doran et al. (2012) that need no implicature.
- Experiment 1 had 400 scripted runs, 200 in the pragmatic condition and 200 in the literal condition. Each run began with a training example, and the model was told to answer only "true" or "false".
- The procedure was preregistered on the Open Science Framework (osf.io/cp29j).
- In the face-management experiment (after Bonnefon, Feeney & Villejoubert, 2009), humans rejected the lower-bounded reading of "some" at different rates:
- 83% in face-boosting contexts;
- 58% in face-threatening contexts.
- ChatGPT rejected it on every trial in both contexts, with zero variance.
- The authors offer two explanations:
- Humans learn literal scalar meanings before pragmatic enrichment, whereas LLM training text is mostly pragmatically loaded.
- Human cognitive economy enriches meaning only when the context calls for it.
Interesting ideas
- I1. Present the same item once with a neutral instruction and once with a "literally true?" instruction, then measure whether the system's verdicts shift; this tests controllability of inference, not just accuracy.
- I2. Pair a speaker's utterance with an explicit FACT and ask whether the utterance is true; the gap between "logically true" and "pragmatically misleading" becomes directly measurable.
- I3. Treat zero variance across a manipulated context as a red flag: if outputs never change when the condition changes, the system is ignoring that factor.
- I4. Model scalar items as a basic literal (lower-bounded) meaning plus an enrichment that fires only when context supports it, rather than hard-wiring the "not all" reading.
- I5. Horn-style scales such as some < most < all drive Q-based implicatures by negating the stronger alternatives the speaker could have used.
For Mova
How these ideas could serve Mova, our small open language model — its files, stages and tests:
- I1 (frames): crate prag could keep the literal truth value and each implicature as separate, labelled outputs, so a query can ask for either one and a regression test can confirm that the two actually diverge.
- I2 (answer): the readers could be tested on items like this, checking that they report "true but underinformative" rather than collapsing it into a plain yes or no.
- I3 (learn): evaluation could include paired context manipulations with known human direction effects, and flag any component whose output distribution stays the same across them.
- I4 (frames): implicature rules in prag could start from the lower-bounded sense and attach the upper-bound inference with a confidence that politeness or face-threat cues can reduce.
- I5 (world): a compiled table of lexical scales (quantifiers, "or/and", degree words) would let the world model generate and track these negated alternatives explicitly.
Fields, topics and concepts
📚 Shelves 2The field of science this work belongs to (OpenAlex fields).Arts and Humanities · 16,039 worksLanguage and Linguistics · 15,891 works
🧭 Topics 1Research subjects and languages the work is about.Implicature · 138 works
Cite
Cite as Zhuang Qiu, Xufeng Duan and Zhenguang Cai. 2023. Does ChatGPT Resemble Humans in Processing Implicatures?. Proceedings of the 4th Natural Logic Meets Machine Learning Workshop.
@inproceedings{qiu2023does,
title = {{Does ChatGPT Resemble Humans in Processing Implicatures?}},
author = {Zhuang Qiu, Xufeng Duan and Zhenguang Cai},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 4th Natural Logic Meets Machine Learning Workshop},
year = {2023},
url = {https://aclanthology.org/2023.naloma-1.3/}
}References
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