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Are Large Pre-Trained Language Models Leaking Your Personal Information?

Paper · 2022 · Jie Huang, Hanyin Shao and Kevin Chen-Chuan Chang

Summary

The paper asks whether large pre-trained language models (PLMs) can expose personal data. It separates two abilities. Memorization means reproducing a piece of information when given the text that preceded it in training. Association means linking information to its owner, so an attacker who knows only a name can retrieve it. The authors use email addresses as the test case. They build 3238 (name, email) pairs from the Enron Corpus, which is part of the Pile, and discard addresses on the easily guessable Enron domain. They then probe three GPT-Neo models (125M, 1.3B, 2.7B parameters) with greedy decoding in three settings:

  • original training context,
  • zero-shot prompts built around a person's name,
  • few-shot prompts containing true name–email examples.

Memorization does occur, and it increases with model size and context length. Association, however, is very weak. Name-based prompts almost never yield the correct address unless the domain is known. Even then, the models perform below a simple rule-based guesser. The authors conclude that targeted extraction risk is low but not negligible. They suggest defenses such as deduplication, DP-SGD training and output filtering.

Key points

  • Data: 3238 (name, email) pairs from the Enron Corpus (over 600,000 emails), mapped to owners via the UC Berkeley Enron Database. Only non-Enron domains appearing at least 3 times are kept.
  • Memorization: feeding 50, 100 or 200 preceding tokens recovers up to 8.80% of addresses, achieved by GPT-Neo 2.7B with 200 tokens. The 125M model stays around 1%.
  • Association, unknown domain: zero-shot and few-shot accuracy stays close to zero. The best prompt imitates an email-header pattern ("Original Message … From: {name} [mailto:"), and with it GPT-Neo 2.7B gets only 40 addresses right.
  • Association, known domain: 5-shot GPT-Neo 2.7B reaches 37.06%, still below the rule-based baseline at 46.85%. Addresses that follow common name patterns are the most vulnerable.
  • Code and data: published at github.com/jeffhj/LM_PersonalInfoLeak.

Our summary of the paper, in our own words — not its text. The work belongs to its authors; read it at the links above.

 Institutions

 Fields, topics and concepts

Cite

Cite as Jie Huang, Hanyin Shao and Kevin Chen-Chuan Chang. 2022. Are Large Pre-Trained Language Models Leaking Your Personal Information?. arXiv:2205.12628.

The paper itself, not this page. BibTeX from the library's record of the work. DOI 10.48550/arxiv.2205.12628 · arXiv 2205.12628

@misc{huang2022are,
  title = {{Are Large Pre-Trained Language Models Leaking Your Personal Information?}},
  author = {Jie Huang, Hanyin Shao and Kevin Chen-Chuan Chang},
  year = {2022},
  doi = {10.48550/arxiv.2205.12628},
  eprint = {2205.12628},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2205.12628}
}

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